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DIRECTORATE OF  
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15 July 1971

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## *CONTENTS*

25X1

[REDACTED]  
NORTH VIETNAM: Hanoi to receive requested military aid from its Communist suppliers. (Page 3)

25X1

[REDACTED]  
COMMUNIST CHINA - USSR: Chou confirms rejection of Moscow's renunciation-of-force proposal. (Page 10)

25X1

[REDACTED]  
PAKISTAN: Famine effort inadequate. (Page 17)

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]  
Approved For Release 2006/10/20 : CIA-RDP79T00975A019500070002-6

**Page Denied**

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

NORTH VIETNAM: Hanoi apparently has recently received commitments from its Communist suppliers for increased military aid.

A North Vietnamese military delegation headed by Vice Minister of Defense Tran Sam returned to Hanoi early this month after a month-long trip to Peking and to undisclosed European Communist capitals. The fact that the delegation went to Europe is known only from the Chinese press. None of the European Communist governments, including Moscow, has mentioned it. Hanoi has also been reticent about the trip; the North Vietnamese have noted only that a new supplementary military aid agreement has been concluded with the Chinese.

**Page Denied**

Next 5 Page(s) In Document Denied

[ ] COMMUNIST CHINA - USSR: Premier Chou En-lai has confirmed Peking's refusal to accept a Soviet proposal made in March regarding the border dispute.

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[ ] prior to the Soviet Party Congress last March, Moscow formally proposed a pact renouncing the use of force in the border dispute for a three-year period during which time a final frontier settlement would be negotiated.

25X1

Chou early in July said Peking considered the offer a plot, and he claimed that Moscow's real intention was to use the initial agreement to create an impression of Communist unity in dealing with the US. This, he said, was revealed by the Soviet specification that the accord should not take effect until it was ratified by the "parliaments" of both countries. Such ratification, however, is not unusual; the recent Soviet-Egyptian treaty was so formalized.

Earlier this year, the Chinese ambassador in Kabul elaborated on Peking's rationale by claiming that the Chinese rejected the Soviet offer because there was no mention of a ban on the use of nuclear weapons and because of their concern over Soviet intentions after the three-year period.

The Chinese have been demanding that Moscow agree to include a nonaggression clause--including use of nuclear weapons--in a preliminary protocol regulating conduct along the border. The protocol itself was a Chinese precondition for discussion of border demarcation. The USSR, however, had previously said a nonaggression pact could only be concluded simultaneously with a definite agreement on the boundary itself.

Moscow apparently shifted to a flexible position in an attempt to meet the Chinese demand for a "preliminary protocol." Although Moscow does not appear optimistic that such flexibility would lead to a border agreement, the USSR probably thinks it [ ]

useful to create a record in order to blunt Chinese charges that Peking is being forced to negotiate under military pressure. If such an agreement were achieved, Moscow could use it to obscure continuing Sino-Soviet difficulties. Peking, however, apparently feels that the border tension has lessened and that state relations have sufficiently improved so that there is no need to reach agreement in the near future.

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25X1



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Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied

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PAKISTAN: The US Consulate General in Dacca reports that an inadequate effort is being made to deal with the threatened famine.

East Pakistan is expected to need 3.4 million tons of imported food grains during the next 12 months, but with the current unsettled conditions it is doubtful that as much as two million tons can be imported and distributed. The consulate believes that the army, the provincial government, and UN officials are all responsible for the failure to tackle the problem effectively.

Bickering between UN Special Representative El Tawil and the UN disaster expert has led to an over-cautious approach that is increased by El Tawil's fear for the safety of UN personnel who might be sent outside Dacca. El Tawil complains that he is getting little support from UN Headquarters, which he thinks is more interested in preserving the organization's reputation than in mounting a relief effort. The UN was, in fact, unprepared to deal with the situation in East Pakistan and has been hampered from the start by organization and money problems as well as by a shortage of technical personnel.

The consulate believes that the caution of the UN officials has contributed to the lack of effort by the Pakistanis. The special government food coordinator has no power and is concerned primarily with his own political and bureaucratic survival. The senior civil servant in the provincial government is incompetent, in the consulate's view. At a lower level, feuding continues and some Bengali officials are deliberately working slowly to sabotage the government effort. Military Governor Tikka Khan does not recognize the seriousness of the situation and does not realize that "telling an inept bureaucracy what to do is not enough." [REDACTED]

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25X1

25X1

25X1

**Page Denied**

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied

25X1

25X1

25X1

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25X11

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